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Abstrat
Agents in dynami multi-agent environments must monitor their peers to exeute in-
dividual and group plans. A key open question is how muh monitoring of other agents'
states is required to be eetive: The Monitoring Seletivity Problem. We investigate this
question in the ontext of deteting failures in teams of ooperating agents, via Soially-
Attentive Monitoring, whih fouses on monitoring for failures in the soial relationships
between the agents. We empirially and analytially explore a family of soially-attentive
teamwork monitoring algorithms in two dynami, omplex, multi-agent domains, under
varying onditions of task distribution and unertainty. We show that a entralized sheme
using a omplex algorithm trades orretness for ompleteness and requires monitoring all
teammates. In ontrast, a simple distributed teamwork monitoring algorithm results in
orret and omplete detetion of teamwork failures, despite relying on limited, unertain
knowledge, and monitoring only key agents in a team. In addition, we report on the design
of a soially-attentive monitoring system and demonstrate its generality in monitoring sev-
eral oordination relationships, diagnosing deteted failures, and both on-line and o-line
appliations.
1. Introdution
Agents in omplex, dynami, multi-agent environments must be able to detet, diagnose,
and reover from failures at run-time (Toyama & Hager, 1997). For instane, a robot's
grip may be slippery, opponents' behavior may be intentionally diult to predit, om-
muniations may fail, et. Examples of suh environments inlude virtual environments for
training (Johnson & Rikel, 1997; Calder, Smith, Courtemanhe, Mar, & Ceranowiz, 1993),
high-delity distributed simulations (Tambe, Johnson, Jones, Koss, Laird, Rosenbloom, &
Shwamb, 1995; Kitano, Tambe, Stone, Veloso, Coradeshi, Osawa, Matsubara, Noda, &
Asada, 1997), and multi-agent robotis (Parker, 1993; Balh, 1998). The rst key step in
this proess is exeution-monitoring (Doyle, Atkinson, & Doshi, 1986; Ambros-Ingerson &
Steel, 1988; Cohen, Amant, & Hart, 1992; Reee & Tate, 1994; Atkins, Durfee, & Shin,
1997; Veloso, Pollak, & Cox, 1998).
Monitoring exeution in multi-agent settings requires an agent to monitor its peers,
sine its own orret exeution depends also on the state of its peers (Cohen & Levesque,
1991; Jennings, 1993; Parker, 1993; Jennings, 1995; Grosz & Kraus, 1996; Tambe, 1997).
Monitoring peers is of partiular importane in teams, sine team-members rely on eah
other and work losely together on related tasks:

2000 AI Aess Foundation and Morgan Kaufmann Publishers. All rights reserved.
Kaminka and Tambe
 Monitoring allows team-members to oordinate their ations and plans with team-
mates, to help teammates and ooperate without interferene. For example, drivers
of ars in a onvoy annot drive without monitoring other ars in the onvoy, so as to
not disband the onvoy, and to help other drivers if ars break down.
 Monitoring allows team-members to use peers as dynami information soures, for
learning new information. For instane, if a driver in a onvoy sees that the other ars
in front of it suddenly turn to the left, she an infer the existene of an obstale or
milestone despite not diretly seeing it herself.
Previous work has investigated dierent ways of monitoring in the ontext of teams of o-
operating agents. For example, theoretial work on SharedPlans (Grosz & Kraus, 1999) has
distinguished between passive monitoring, in whih an agent is notied when a proposition
hanges (e.g., via ommuniations), and ative monitoring, in whih an agent atively seeks
to nd out when a proposition hanges (e.g., via observations and inferene of unobservable
attributes). Pratial implementations have investigated the use of passive monitoring via
ommuniations (Jennings, 1995), ative monitoring via plan-reognition (Huber & Dur-
fee, 1995), ative impliit monitoring via the environment (Fenster, Kraus, & Rosenshein,
1995), and dierent ombinations of these methods (Parker, 1993; Jennings, 1993; Tambe,
1997; Lesh, Rih, & Sidner, 1999). No approah is learly superior to another: Passive
monitoring is generally pereived as being less ostly than ative monitoring, but also less
reliable (Grosz & Kraus, 1999; Huber & Durfee, 1995; Kaminka & Tambe, 1998).
Regardless of the monitoring method, bandwidth and omputational limitations prohibit
a monitoring agent from monitoring all other agents to full extent, all the time (Jennings,
1995; Durfee, 1995; Grosz & Kraus, 1996). Thus a key open question is how muh monitor-
ing of other agents is required to be eetive (in teams) (Jennings, 1993; Grosz & Kraus,
1996, 1999). We all this hallenging problem the Monitoring Seletivity Problem, i.e., the
problem of seletivity in observing others and inferring their state (based on the obser-
vations) for monitoring. Although it has been raised in the past, only a framework and
minimal onstraints for answers were provided (Jennings, 1993; Grosz & Kraus, 1996). For
instane, the theory of SharedPlans requires agents to verify that their intentions do not
onit with those of teammates (Grosz & Kraus, 1996). However, the methods by whih
suh veriation an take plae are left for further investigation (Grosz & Kraus, 1996, p.
308). Setion 8 provides more details on related work.
This paper begins to address the monitoring seletivity problem in teams, by investi-
gating monitoring requirements for eetive failure detetion. We fous our investigation
on deteting failures in the soial relationships that ideally hold between agents in a mon-
itored team. We all suh monitoring of soial relationships soially-attentive monitoring,
to dierentiate it from other types of monitoring, suh as monitoring for failures in the
progress of agents towards their goals. Here, the term soial relationship is used to denote a
relation on attributes of multiple agents' states. Soially-attentive monitoring in the onvoy
example involves verifying that agents have ommon destination and heading, that their
beliefs in driving as a onvoy are mutual, et. For instane, if the agents are observed to
head in dierent diretions, they learly do not have a ommon heading. This is dierent
than monitoring whether their hosen (ommon) heading leads towards their (agreed upon)
destination.
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Monitoring relationships in a team (soially-attentive monitoring) is a ritial task in
monitoring team-members. Failures to maintain the team's relationships an often lead
to atastrophi failures on the part of the team, lak of ooperative behavior and lak of
oordination. Suh failures are often the result of individual agent failures, suh as failures
in an agent's sensors and atuators. Thus soially-attentive monitoring overs a large lass
of failures, and promotes robust individual operation.
We explore soially-attentive monitoring algorithms for deteting teamwork failures un-
der various onditions of unertainty. We analytially show that despite the presene of
unertainty about the atual state of monitored agents, a entralized ative monitoring
sheme an guarantee failure detetion that is either sound and inomplete, or omplete
and unsound. However, this requires reasoning about multiple hypotheses as to the atual
state of monitored agents, and monitoring all agents in the team. We show that ative
distributed teamwork monitoring results in both sound and omplete detetion apabilities,
despite using a muh simpler algorithm. This distributed algorithm: (a) uses only a single,
possibly inorret hypothesis of the atual state of monitored agents, and (b) involves moni-
toring only key agents in a team, not neessarily all team-members. Using a transformation
on the analytial onstruts, we show analogous results for entralized failure-detetion in
mutual-exlusion oordination relationships.
We also ondut an empirial investigation of soially-attentive monitoring in teams.
We present an implemented general soially-attentive monitoring framework in whih the
expeted ideal soial relationships that are to be maintained by the agents are ompared
to the atual soial relationships. Disrepanies are deteted as possible failures and diag-
nosed. We apply this framework to two dierent omplex, dynami, multi-agent domains,
in servie of monitoring various soial relationships, both on-line and o-line. Both of these
domains involve multiple interating agents in ollaborative and adversarial settings, with
unertainties in both pereption and ation. In one domain, we provide empirial results
for ative monitoring whih onrm our analytial results. In another domain we show how
o-line soially-attentive monitoring an provide quantitative teamwork quality feedbak to
a designer. We also provide initial diagnosis proedures for deteted failures.
Our fous in these explorations is on pratial algorithms that have guarantees on perfor-
mane in real-world appliations. The algorithms we present seek to omplement the use of
passive ommuniations-based monitoring (whih is unreliable in many domains) and explore
the use of unintrusive key-hole plan-reognition as an alternative. However, we do not rule
out the use of ommuniationswe simply seek to provide tehniques that an work even
when ommuniations fail. Our analytial guarantees of failure-detetion soundness and
ompleteness hold whether monitoring is done through ommuniations or plan-reognition.
This paper is organized as follows: Setion 2 presents motivating examples and bak-
ground. Setion 3 presents the soially-attentive monitoring framework. Setion 4 explores
monitoring seletivity in entralized teamwork monitoring. Setion 5 explores monitoring
seletivity in distributed teamwork monitoring. Setion 6 demonstrates the generality of our
framework by applying it in an o-line onguration. Setion 7 presents investigations of ad-
ditional relationship models. Setion 8 presents related work, and Setion 9 onludes. The
two appendies ontain the proofs for theorems presented (Appendix A), and pseudo-ode
for the soially-attentive monitoring algorithms (Appendix B).
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2. Motivation and Bakground
The monitoring seletivity problem this paper addresseshow muh monitoring is required
for failure-detetion in teamsrose out of growing frustration with the signiant software
maintenane eorts in two of our appliation domains. In the ModSAF domain, a high-
delity battleeld virtual environment (Calder et al., 1993), we have been involved in the
development of syntheti heliopter pilots (Tambe et al., 1995). In the RoboCup soer
simulation domain (Kitano et al., 1997) we have been involved in developing syntheti so-
er players (Marsella, Adibi, Al-Onaizan, Kaminka, Muslea, Tallis, & Tambe, 1999). The
environments in both domains are dynami and omplex, and have many unertainties:
the behavior of other agents (some of it adversarial, some ooperative), unreliable ommu-
niations and sensors, ations whih may not exeute as intended, et. Agents in these
environments are therefore presented with ountless opportunities for failure despite the
designers' best eorts.
Some examples may serve to illustrate. The following two examples are atual failures
that ourred in the ModSAF domain. We will use these two to illustrate and explore
soially-attentive monitoring throughout this paper:
Example 1. Here, a team of three heliopter pilot agents were to y to a speied way-
point (a given position), where one of the team-members, the sout, was to y forward
towards the enemy, while its teammates (attakers) land and wait for its signal. All of the
agents monitored for the way-point. However, due to an unexpeted sensor failure, one of
the attakers failed to sense the way-point. So while the other attaker orretly landed,
the failing attaker ontinued to y forward with the sout (see Figure 1 for a sreen shot
illustrating this failure).
Example 2. In a dierent run, after all three agents reahed the way-point and deteted it,
the sout has gone forward and identied the enemy. It then sent a message to the waiting
attakers to join it and attak the enemy. One of the attakers did not reeive the message,
and so it remained behind indenitely while the sout and the other attaker ontinued the
mission alone.
We have olleted dozens of similar reports in both the ModSAF and RoboCup domain.
In general, suh failures are diult to antiipate in design time, due to the huge number of
possible states. The agents therefore easily nd themselves in novel states whih have not
been foreseen by the developer, and the monitoring onditions and ommuniations in plae
proved insuient: In none of the failure ases reported did the agents involved detet, let
alone orret, their erroneous behavior. Eah agent believed the other agents to be ating in
oordination with it, sine no ommuniation was reeived from the other agents to indiate
otherwise. However, the agents were violating the ollaboration relationships between them,
as the agents ame to disagree on what plan is being exeuteda ollaboration relationship
failure had ourred. Preliminary empirial results show that upwards of 30% of failures
reported involved relationship violations (relationship failures).
Human observers, however, were typially quik to notie these failures, beause of the
lear soial misbehavior of the agents in these ases. They were able to infer that a failure
has ourred despite not knowing what exatly happened. For instane, seeing an attaker
ontinuing to y ahead despite its teammates' swithing to a dierent plan (whih the human
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Scout (ahead) and failing attacker (trailing) Landing attackerEnemy
Figure 1: A plan-view display (the ModSAF domain) illustrating the failure in Example 1.
The thik wavy lines are ontour lines.
observers inferred from the fat that one of the teammates, the other attaker, has landed)
is suient for an observer to detet that something has gone amisswithout knowing what
the dierent plan was.
Our analysis showed that the agents were not monitoring eah other suiently. How-
ever, a naive solution of ontinuous ommuniations between the agents was learly impra-
tial sine: (i) the agents are operating in a hostile environment; (ii) the ommuniations
overheads would have been prohibitive; and (iii) in fat, it was the ommuniations equip-
ment itself that broke down in some ases. We therefore sought pratial ways to ahieve
quik detetion of failure, based on the limited ambiguous knowledge that was available to
a monitoring agent.
3. Soially-Attentive Monitoring
We begin with an overview of the general struture of a soially-attentive monitoring sys-
tem, shown in Figure 2. It onsists of: (1) a soial relationship knowledge-base ontaining
models of the relationships that should hold among the monitored agents, enabling gen-
eration of expeted ideal behavior in terms of relationships (Setion 3.1); (2) an agent and
team modeling omponent, responsible for olleting and representing knowledge about the
monitored agents' atual behavior (Setion 3.2); (3) a relationship failure-detetion ompo-
nent that monitors for violations of relationships among monitored agents by ontrasting
the expeted and atual behavior (Setion 3.3); and (4) a relationship diagnosis omponent
that veries the failures, and provides an explanation for them (Setion 3.4). The resulting
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explanation (diagnosis) is then used for reovery, e.g., by a negotiations system (Kraus,
Syara, & Evenhik, 1998), or a general (re)planner (Ambros-Ingerson & Steel, 1988).
What agent attributes
Monitored Agent
Monitored Agent
Agent/Team Modeling Component
Social Relationships Knowledge-Base
Diagnosis Detections
Failure
RelationshipRelationship Detected
Failure
Actual
Behavior
What agents to monitor,
Diagnosis
Expected
Attribute
Values
Actual Values
Expected Behavior
Socially-Attentive Monitoring System
Communications
Observations,
Figure 2: The general struture of a soially-attentive monitoring system.
3.1 A Knowledge-Base of Relationship Models
We take a relationship among agents to be a relation on their state attributes. A relationship
model thus speies how dierent attributes of an agent's state are related to those of
other agents in a multi-agent system. These attributes an inlude the beliefs held by the
agents, their goals, plans, ations, et. For example, many teamwork relationship models
require that team-members have mutual belief in a joint goal (Cohen & Levesque, 1991;
Jennings, 1995). A spatial formation relationship (Parker, 1993; Balh, 1998) speies
relative distanes, and veloities that are to be maintained by a group of agents (in our
domain, heliopter pilots). Coordination relationships may speify temporal relationships
that are to hold among the ations of two agents, e.g., business ontrators (Malone &
Crowston, 1991). All suh relationships are soialthey expliitly speify how multiple
agents are to at and what they are to believe if they are to maintain the relationships
between them.
The relationship knowledge-base ontains models of the relationships that are supposed
to hold in the system, and speies the agents that are partiipating in the relationships. The
knowledge-base guides the agent-modeling omponent in seleting agents to be monitored,
and what attributes of their state need be represented (for detetion and diagnosis). It is
used by the failure detetion omponent to generate expetations whih are ontrasted with
atual relationships maintained by the agents. And it provides the diagnosis omponent with
detailed information about how agents' states' attributes are related, to drive the diagnosis
proess. Our implementation of soially-attentive monitoring in teams uses four types of
relationships: formations, role-similarity, mutual exlusion, and teamwork.
For teamwork monitoring we use the STEAM (Tambe, 1997) general domain-
independent model of teamwork, whih is based on Cohen and Levesque's Joint Intentions
Framework (Levesque, Cohen, & Nunes, 1990; Cohen & Levesque, 1991) and Grosz, Sidner,
and Kraus's SharedPlans (Grosz & Sidner, 1990; Grosz & Kraus, 1996, 1999). However,
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other teamwork models may be used instead of STEAM. Although STEAM is used by our
pilot and soer agents to generate ollaborative behavior, it is reused here independently
in servie of monitoring, i.e., monitored agents are assumed to be a team, and STEAM is
used in monitoring their teamwork. STEAM and other teamwork models (e.g., Cohen &
Levesque, 1991; Jennings, 1995; Rih & Sidner, 1997) require mutual belief by team mem-
bers in their joint goals and plans. This harateristi is used to monitor teamwork in our
system. The other relationship models are used only in a seondary monitoring role. They
will be disussed in greater length in Setion 7.
3.2 Knowledge of Monitored Agents and Team
The agent modeling omponent is responsible for aquiring and maintaining knowledge
about monitored agents. This knowledge is used to onstrut the atual relations that exist
between agents' states' attributes, whih are ompared to the ideal expeted relations. In this
setion, we desribe the plan-reognition apabilities of the agent-modeling omponent in our
implementation and experiments, i.e., the extent of the knowledge that ould be maintained
about monitored agents' plans if neessary. Later setions show that in fat limited, possibly
inaurate, knowledge is suient for eetive failure detetion. Thus implementations may
use optimized agent-modeling algorithms rather than these full apabilities. Setion 3.4 will
disuss additional agent-modeling apabilities, neessary for diagnosis.
3.2.1 Representation
For monitoring teamwork relationships, we have found that representing agents in terms of
their seleted hierarhial reative plans enables quik monitoring of their state, and also
failitates further inferene of the monitored agents' beliefs, goals, and unobservable ations,
sine they apture the agents' deision proesses.
In this representation, reative plans (Firby, 1987; Newell, 1990) form a single deompo-
sition hierarhy (a tree) that represents the alternative ontrolling proesses of eah agent.
Eah reative plan in the hierarhy (hereafter referred to simply as a plan) has seletion
onditions (also referred to as preonditions) for when it is appliable, and termination on-
ditions whih are used to terminate or suspend plans. At eah given moment, the agent is
exeuting a single path (root to a leaf) through the hierarhy. This path is omposed of
plans at dierent levels.
Figure 3 presents a small portion of suh a hierarhy, reated for the ModSAF domain. In
the ase of Example 1, prior to the way-point, eah of the agents was exeuting the path be-
ginning with exeute-mission as highest-level plan, through fly-flight-plan, fly-route,
traveling and low-level. Upon reahing the way-point, they were all supposed to swith
from fly-flight-plan and its desendents to wait-at-point. The attakers would then
selet just-wait as a hild of wait-at-point, while the sout would selet sout-forward
and its desendents. Of ourse, the failing attaker did not detet the way-point and so the
termination onditions for fly-flight-plan and the seletion onditions for wait-at-point
were not satised and the failing attaker ontinued to exeute fly-flight-plan and its
desendents.
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Wait at Point
Execute-Mission
Nap of the Earth Contour Low Level Just Wait
Scout Forward
Traveling
Fly Flight Plan (F)  (W) Join Scout (J) Ordered Halt (H)
Fly Route
Figure 3: Portion of Hierarhial Reative Plan Library for ModSAF Domain (Team plans
are boxed. These are explained in Setion 3.3).
3.2.2 Aquisition
From a pratial perspetive, while the agents may ooperatively report to the monitoring
agent on their own state using ommuniations, it requires ommuniation hannels to be
suiently fast, reliable and seure. This is unfortunately not possible in many realisti
domains, as our examples demonstrate (Setion 2).
Alternatively, a monitor may use plan-reognition to infer the agents' unobservable state
from their observable behavior. This approah is unintrusive and robust in fae of ommuni-
ation failures. Of ourse, the monitor may still benet from foused ommuniations with
the other agents, but would not be ritially dependent on them.
To enable plan-reognition using reative plans (our hosen representation), we have
employed a reative plan-reognition algorithm alled RESL (REal-time Situated Least-
ommitments). The key apability required is to allow expliit maintenane of hierarhial
plan hypotheses mathing eah agent's observed behavior, while pruning of hypotheses whih
are deemed inorret or useless for monitoring purposes. RESL works by expanding the
entire plan-library hierarhy for eah modeled agent, and tagging all paths mathing the
observed behavior of the agent being modeled (see Appendix B for pseudo-ode for the
algorithm). Heuristis and external knowledge may be used to eliminate paths (hypotheses)
whih are deemed inappropriateindeed suh heuristis will be explored shortly. RESL's
basi approah is very similar to previous work in reative plan reognition (Rao, 1994) and
team-traking (Tambe, 1996), whih have been used suessfully in the ModSAF domain,
and share many of RESL's properties. However, RESL adds belief-inferene apabilities
whih are used in the diagnosis proess, disussed below (Setion 3.4).
Figure 4 gives a simplied presentation of the plan hierarhies for a variation of Example
1, in whih all the agents orretly deteted the way-point, i.e., no failure has ourred (note
that some plans at intermediate levels have been abstrated out in the gure). The sout
(Figure 4a) and the two attakers (Figures 4b, 4) swithed from the fly-flight-plan plan
(denoted by F) to the wait-at-point plan (denoted by W). An outside observer using RESL
infers explanations for eah agent's behavior by observing the agents. The sout ontinues
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to y ahead, its speed and altitude mathing low-level, one of the possible ight-methods
under both the fly-flight-plan (F) and wait-at-point (W) plans. Thus they are both
tagged as possible hypotheses for the sout's exeuting plan hierarhy. Similarly, as the
attakers land, RESL reognizes that they are exeuting the just-wait plan. However,
this plan an be used in servie of either the W or the ordered-halt (H) plana plan in
whih the heliopters are ordered by their headquarters to land immediately. Thus both
H and W are tagged as explanations for eah of the attakers' states (at the seond level of
the hierarhies). For all agents, RESL identies the plan exeute-mission as the top-level
plan. In this illustration, the atual exeuting paths of the agents are marked with lled
arrows. Other individual modeling hypotheses that math the observed behavior are marked
using dashed arrows. An outside observer, of ourse, has no way of knowing whih of the
possible hypotheses is orret.
Execute Mission Execute Mission
Just-Wait Just-Wait Just-Wait
(a) (b) (c)
Low-Level
Execute Mission 
Wait-at-Point (W) Ordered-Halt (H)Wait-at-Point (W) Fly-Flight-Plan (F)
Low-Level
Wait-at-Point (W)
Just-Wait
Ordered-Halt (H)
Figure 4: Sout (a) and Attakers' (b, ) atual and reognized abbreviated reative plan
hierarhies.
One individual modeling hypotheses are aquired for eah individual agent (using plan-
reognition in our implementation, but potentially also by ommuniations), the monitoring
agent must ombine them to reate team-modeling hypotheses as to the state of the team
as a whole. The monitoring agent selets a single individual modeling hypothesis for eah
individual agent and ombines them into a single team-modeling hypothesis. Several suh
team-modeling hypotheses are possible given multiple hypotheses for individual agents. For
instane, in Figure 4, while all team-hypotheses will have exeution-mission as the top-
level plan, there are eight dierent team-hypotheses whih an be dierentiated by their
seond-level plan: (W,W,W), (W,W,H), (W,H,W), (W,H,H), (F,W,W), (F,W,H), (F,H,W), (F,H,H). If the
observer is a member of the team, it knows what it is exeuting itself, but would still have
multiple-hypotheses about its teammates' states. For instane, if the attaker in Figure 4b
is monitoring its teammates, its hypotheses at the seond level would be (W,W,W), (W,W,H),
(F,W,W), (F,W,H).
To avoid expliitly representing a ombinatorial number of hypotheses, RESL expliitly
maintains all andidate hypotheses for eah agent individually, but not all ombinations
of individual models as team hypotheses. Instead, these ombinations are impliitly repre-
sented. Thus the number of hypotheses expliitly maintained grows linearly in the number
of agents.
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3.3 Relationship Violation Detetion
The failure-detetion omponent detets violations of the soial relationships that should
hold among agents. This is done by omparing the ideal expeted relationships to their
atual maintenane by the agents. For teamwork speially, the relationship model requires
team-members to always agree on whih team plan is jointly exeuted by the team, similarly
to Joint Responsibility (Jennings, 1995), and SharedPlans (Grosz & Kraus, 1996). If this
requirement fails in atuality (i.e., the agents are exeuting dierent team plans) then a
teamwork failure has ourred.
The basi teamwork failure detetion algorithm is as follows. The monitored agents'
plan-hierarhies are proessed in a top-down manner. The detetion omponent uses the
teamwork model to tag spei plans as team plans, expliitly representing joint ativity by
the team (these plans are boxed in Figures 3, 5 and 4). The team-plans in equal depths
of the hierarhies are used to reate team-modeling hypotheses. For eah hypothesis, the
plans of dierent agents are ompared to detet disagreements. Any dierene found is an
indiation of failure. If no dierenes are found, or if the omparison reahes individual
plans (non-team, therefore non-boxed in the gures) no failure is deteted. Individual plans,
whih may be hosen by an agent individually in servie of team plans are not boxed in
these gures, and are handled using other relationships as disussed in Setion 7
For instane, suppose the failing attaker from Example 1 is monitoring the other at-
taker. Figure 5 shows its view of its own hierarhial plan on the left. The path on the
right represents the state of the other attaker (who has landed). This state has been in-
ferred in this example from observations made by the monitoring attaker (here, we are
assuming that the plan-reognition proess has resulted in one orret hypothesis for eah
agent. We will disuss more realisti settings below). In Figure 5, the dierene that would
be deteted is marked by the arrow between the two plans at the seond level from the top.
While the failing attaker is exeuting the fly-flight-plan team-plan (on the left), the
other attaker is exeuting the wait-at-point team-plan (on the right). The disagreement
on whih team-plan is to be exeuted is a failure of teamwork.
Execute Mission
Wait-at-Point
Just-Wait
Fly-Flight-Plan
Fly-Route
Traveling
Low-Level
Execute Mission
Figure 5: Comparing two hierarhial plans. The top-most dierene is at level 2.
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Deteting disagreements is diult with multiple team-modeling hypotheses, sine they
may imply ontraditory results with respet to failure detetion: Some hypotheses may im-
ply that a failure had ourred in the team, while others may not. Unfortunately, this is to
be expeted in realisti appliations. For instane, Figure 4 (Setion 3.2) shows several hy-
potheses that are possible based on the same observations. However, one of the hypotheses,
(W,W,W), implies no failure has ourredall the agents are in agreement on whih team-plan
is exeutingwhile another hypothesis, (F,W,H), implies failures have ourred.
To limit reasoning to only a small number of team hypotheses, while not restriting
failure-detetion apabilities, we use a disambiguation heuristi that ranks team-modeling
hypotheses by the level of oherene they represent. This heuristi is provided as an initial
solution. Later setions will examine additional heuristis.
Denition 1. The oherene level of a multi-agent modeling hypothesis is dened as the
ratio of the number of agents modeled to the number of plans ontained in the hypothesis.
This denition results in a partial ordering of the hypotheses set, from the least oherent
hypothesis (one that assigns eah agent a dierent plan than its team-mates), to the most
oherent hypothesis (that assigns the same plan to all team members). For instane, the
hypothesis (F,W,H) would have the lowest level of oherene, 1, sine it implies omplete
breakdown of teamworkevery agent is exeuting a dierent plan. The hypothesis (W,W,W)
would have a oherene level of 3, the highest level of oherene for the group of three agents,
sine they are all assigned the same plan. Ranked between them would be the hypothesis
(W,W,H), with a single teamwork failure (disagreement on W and H) and a oherene level of
3/2.
The detetion omponent selets a single maximally-oherent team-modeling hypothesis
(ties broken randomly). The intuition for using oherene is that failures to agree our
despite the agents' attempts at teamwork. Thus we expet more agreements than disagree-
ments in the team. The oherene level of a team-hypothesis is inversely related to the
number of teamwork failures implied by the hypothesis. Seleting a maximally-oherent hy-
pothesis therefore orresponds to the minimum-number-of-failures heuristi ommonly used
in diagnosis (Hamsher, Console, & de Kleer, 1992).
For the ase depited in Figure 4, the omplete detetion proess may be oneptu-
alized as follows
1
. Suppose that one of the attakers, whose hierarhy is desribed in
Figure 4b, is monitoring the team. First, it ollets the plan hypotheses at the top of
the hierarhy for eah agent (inluding itself). In this ase, they are {exeute-mission},
{exeute-mission}, {exeute-mission}. Only one team-modeling hypothesis an be built
from these: (exeute-mission, exeute-mission, exeute-mission). Sine this hypoth-
esis shows no disagreement ours at this level, the proess ontinues to the seond level.
Here, the hypotheses for the rst agent on the left are {F,W}, for the monitoring seond agent
(sine it knows its own state) there is only one possibility {W}, and for the third agent {W,H}.
As we saw above, the maximally team-oherent hypothesis is (W,W,W) whih is seleted. Sine
it does not indiate failure, the proess ontinues to the third level. Here the agents are
exeuting individual plans, and so the omparison proess stops. Algorithm 2 in Appendix
B provides greater details about this proess.
1. Other implementations may make use of optimized algorithms in whih the heuristis are integrated into
the agent-modeling algorithm.
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When sub-teams are introdued, a dierene between team-plans may be explained by
the agents in question being a part of dierent sub-teams. Sub-team members still have
to agree between themselves on the joint sub-team plans, but these may dier from one
sub-team to the next. For now, let us assume that the teams under onsideration are simple
teams, as dened in Denition 2. We make this denition in servie of later analytial results
in whih it will appear as a ondition. We return to the issue of sub-teams in Setion 7.1.
Denition 2. We say that a team T is simple, if its plan-hierarhy involves no dierent
team plans whih are to be exeuted by dierent sub-teams.
Intuitively, the idea is that in a simple team, all members of the team jointly exeute
eah of the team plans in the hierarhy. This denition is somewhat similar to the denition
of a ground team in (Kinny, Ljungberg, Rao, Sonenberg, Tidhar, & Werner, 1992), but it
does not allow sub-team members of a team to have a joint plan whih is dierent than that
of other members.
3.4 Relationship Diagnosis
The diagnosis omponent onstruts an explanation for the deteted failure, identifying the
failure state and failitating reovery. The diagnosis is given in terms of a set of agent
belief dierenes (inonsistenies) that explains the failure to maintain the relationship.
The starting point for this proess is the deteted failure (e.g., the dierene in team-plans).
The diagnosis proess then ompares the beliefs of the agents involved to produe a set of
inonsistent beliefs that explain the failure.
Two problems exist in pratial appliations of this proedure. First, the monitoring
agent is not likely to have aess to all of the beliefs held by the monitored agents, sine it
is not feasible in pratie to ommuniate all the agents' beliefs to eah other. Seond, eah
agent in a real-world domain may have many beliefs, and many of them will vary among the
agents, though most of them will be irrelevant to the diagnosis. Thus relevant knowledge
may be simply not be aessible, or may be hidden in mountains of irrelevant fats.
To gain knowledge of the beliefs of monitored agents without relying on ommuniations,
the diagnosis proess uses a proess of belief asription. The agent-modeling omponent (us-
ing RESL in our implementation) maintains knowledge about the seletion and termination
onditions of reognized plans (hypotheses). For eah reognized plan hypothesis, the mod-
eling omponent infers that any termination onditions for the plan are believed to be false
by the monitored agent (sine it has not terminated the plan). We have also found it useful
to use an additional heuristi, and infer that the seletion onditions (preonditions) for
any plan whih has just begun exeution are true. The idea is that when a plan is seleted
for exeution, its preonditions are likely to hold, at least for a short period of time. This
heuristi involves an expliit assumption on the part of our system that the new plan is
reognized as soon as it begins exeution. Designers in other domains will need to verify
that this assumption holds.
For eah agent i, the inferred termination and seletion onditions make up a set of beliefs
B
i
for the agent. For instane, suppose an agent is hypothesized to have just swithed from
exeuting fly-flight-plan to wait-at-point. RESL infers that the agent believes that
the way-point was just deteted (a seletion ondition for wait-at-point). In addition,
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RESL infers that the agent believes that an enemy was not seen, and that no order was
reeived from base to halt the mission (negated termination onditions of wait-at-point).
To determine the fats that are relevant to the failure, the diagnosis omponent uses
the teamwork model. The teamwork model ditates whih beliefs the agents hold must be
mutually believed by all the agents in the team. Any dierene that is deteted in those
beliefs is a ertain failure, as the team members do not agree on issues on whih agreement
is mandatory to partiipation in the team. The teamwork model thus speies that the
beliefs ontained in the B
i
sets should be mutual, and should therefore be onsistent:
[
i
B
i
6`?
If an inonsisteny is deteted, the diagnosis proedure looks for ontraditions (disagree-
ments) that would ause the dierene in team-plan seletion. A dierene in beliefs serves
as the diagnosis, allowing the monitoring agent to initiate a proess of reovery, e.g., by
negotiating about the oniting beliefs (Kraus et al., 1998).
For example, as shown in Setion 3.3, the two attakers in Example 1 (Setion 2) dier
in their hoie of a team-plan: One attaker is ontinuing exeution of the fly-flight-plan
plan, in whih the heliopters y in formation. The other attaker has deteted the way-
point, terminated fly-flight-plan and has swithed to wait-at-point, landing immedi-
ately (Figure 5). When the failing attaker monitors its team-mate, it detets a dierene in
the team-plans (Setion 3.3), and the deteted dierene is passed to diagnosis. The failing
attaker makes the following inferenes:
1. Fly-flight-plan has three termination onditions: (a) seeing the enemy, (b) deteting
the way-point, or () reeiving an order to halt. The failing attaker (left hierarhy in
Figure 5) knows its own belief that none of these onditions hold, and thus
B
1
= f:WayPoint;:Enemy;:HaltOrderg
2. Wait-at-point has one seletion ondition: the way-point has been deteted. Its
termination ondition is that the sout has sent a message to join it, having identied
the enemy's position. The diagnosis omponent in this ase therefore infers that for
the other attaker (right hierarhy in Figure 5)
B
2
= fWayPoint;:SoutMessageReeivedg
Then,
B
1
[B
2
= f:WayPoint;WayPoint;:Enemy;:SoutMessageReeived;:HaltOrderg
whih is inonsistent. The inonsisteny (disagreement between the attakers) is
f:WayPoint;WayPointg, i.e., ontraditory beliefs aboutWaypoint. Thus now the failing
attaker knows that its team-mate has seen the way-point. It an hoose to quietly adapt
this belief, thereby terminating its own fly-flight-plan and seleting wait-at-point, or
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it may hoose other reovery ations, suh as negotiating with the other attaker on whether
the way-point has been reahed.
We have found these diagnosis proedures to be useful in many of the failures deteted
by soially-attentive monitoring (see Setion 4 for evaluation and disussion). However,
sine this paper fouses on the monitoring seletivity problem in detetion, we leave further
investigation of the diagnosis proedures to future work.
4. Monitoring Seletivity in Centralized Teamwork Monitoring
Using the soially-attentive framework of Setion 3 we systematially examine all failure
permutations of Examples 1 and 2 (Setion 2) under a entralized teamwork monitoring
onguration, where a single team-member is monitoring the team. We vary the agents
failing (attaker, attaker and sout, et.) and the role of the monitoring agent (attaker or
sout). We report on the empirial results of deteting and diagnosing failures in all ases.
Using these empirial results as a guide, we explore entralized teamwork monitoring analyt-
ially. We show that even under monitoring unertainty, entralized teamwork monitoring
an provide either sound or omplete detetion results (but not both).
As a starting point for our exploration, the monitoring agent uses a single maximally-
oherent team-modeling hypothesis as disussed in Setion 3.3. We begin with Example 2.
The normal order of exeution is wait-at-point (W), followed by join-sout (J). During
the exeution of W, the two attakers land and wait for the sout to visually identify the
enemy's position. Upon identiation, the sout sends them a message to join it, whih
triggers the seletion of the J plan, and the termination of the W plan. When exeuting J,
the sout hovers at low altitude, waiting for the attakers to join it. Any failures here are
on the part of the attakers (they annot reeive the message) or on the part of the sout (it
annot send it). These failures arise, for instane, if the radio is broken or team-members
are out of range. When an agent fails, it ontinues to exeute W instead of swithing to J.
Table 1 summarizes the permutations of Example 2. The permutation number appear
in the rst olumn. The next three olumns show the atual plans seleted by the three
agents A1, A2 and A3 in eah permutation. The seond-to-last olumn shows whether a
relationship failure has ourred in eah ase, i.e., whether disagreement exists between the
agents. Finally, the last olumn details the physial onditions in eah ase. There are ve
possible failure permutations: In ase 1, none of the agents failed. In ases 2 and 3 one
attaker failed. In ase 4 the sout failed to send a message or both attakers failed to
reeive it. In ase 5 the sout does not identify the enemy's position (so no message is sent,
and all three agents ontinue to exeute the W plan). Other permutations are not possible,
sine no attaker an swith to the J plan without the sout.
For instane, ase 2 in Table 1 orresponds to Example 2. The sout (A3) has deteted
the enemy, swithed to plan J, and sent a message to the attakers to join it. One attaker
(A2) reeived the message, swithed to plan J, and began ying towards the sout. However,
the remaining attaker (A1) failed to reeive the message, and so it maintains its position,
ontinuing to exeute W and failing to swith to J. Sine the agents are no longer in agreement
on whih team plan should be jointly exeuted, a teamwork failure has ourred. Condition
monitors were used in the original failure ase to monitor for the sout's message. However
failures in ommuniations resulted in these monitoring onditions to be rendered useless.
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Case Atual Exeuting Plans Relationship Failure Physial
# Attaker A1 Attaker A2 Sout A3 Ourred? Failure
1 J J J - -
2 W J J + A1 fails to reeive
3 J W J + A2 fails to reeive
4 W W J + A3's message lost
5 W W W - Enemy not identied
Table 1: All possible failure permutations of the broken radio-link senario (Example 2).
One key issue is raised by ase 5 in Table 1. Here, due to the sout's inability to identify
the enemy's position (perhaps due to failure on the sout's part, perhaps beause the enemy
is simply not there), the three heliopter pilots remain in agreement that the enemy has not
been identied. Here, even though learly the pilots are failing to make progress towards the
task goals (the sout ontinues to searh for the enemy indenitely), no relationship failure
is taking plae, sine the agents are maintaining the teamwork relationship while failing to
make progress. This learly demonstrates that not all failures are neessarily relationship
failures.
Table 2 presents the results of the sout monitoring its teammates in Example 2, using a
maximally team-oherent hypothesis as the basis for detetion. The rst olumn again shows
the ase number, for referene into Table 1. The next three olumns show the sout's (A3's)
hypothesis about what plan eah agent is exeuting aording to the maximal oherene
heuristi. The next two olumns show whether a failure was deteted, and whether it was
diagnosed orretly. The last olumn shows the detetion lass (disussed below).
Case A3's Hypothesized Exeuting Plans Relationship Failure Diagnosis Detetion
# Attaker A1 Attaker A2 Sout A3 Deteted? Suess? Class
1 J J J - n/a True Negative
2 W J J + + True Positive
3 J W J + + True Positive
4 H H J + - True Positive
5 W W W - n/a True Negative
Table 2: Sout's (A3) monitoring results in all permutations of Example 2.
For example, ase 2 in Table 2 shows the results of the sout monitoring in the original
failure in Example 2 (Setion 2). Using RESL, and seleting a maximally-oherent hypoth-
esis, the sout hypothesizes that the non-moving attaker is exeuting W (ase 2, olumn 2),
while the moving attaker is exeuting J (ase 2, olumn 3). The sout of ourse knows that
its own seleted plan J (ase 2, olumn 4). A violation of the teamwork relationship is thus
deteted (ase 2, olumn 5), sine A1's W is not in agreement with the rest of the team's J.
Furthermore, the diagnosis was suessful in identifying the ause for the failure, i.e., the
fat that the enemy's position has been identied by the sout, but no knowledge of this
was passed on to the failing attaker (ase 2, olumn 6).
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The last olumn of Table 2 shows the detetion lass of eah failure. The detetion lass
of a ase an be one of: true positive, true negative, false positive, and false negative. These
orrespond to the following possible monitoring outomes: A true positive is an outome
where a relationship failure has atually ourred, and has been deteted. A true negative
is where no failure has ourred, and the system orretly reports none is being deteted.
A false positive is where no failure has ourred, but the system nevertheless inorretly
detets one, and a false negative is where a failure has ourred, but the system fails to
detet it. Table 2 shows that in all permutations of Example 2 the teamwork monitoring
tehniques did not enounter the problemati false positive or false negative ases.
A loser look at these results hints at a key ontribution of this paper in addressing the
monitoring seletivity problem: Eetive failure detetion an take plae despite the use of
unertain, limited, knowledge about monitored agents. In ase 4 of Table 2, the monitor-
ing agent was able to detet the failure despite being wrong about the state of the agents
involved. The sout believes that the two attakers are exeuting the H (ordered-halt)
plan, but they are atually exeuting, W. H is seleted when a ommand is reeived from
headquarters to halt exeution and hover in plae. From the sout's perspetive, a hov-
ering attaker an therefore be inferred to be exeuting H or W. Thus two equally-ranked
maximally-oherent hypotheses exist: the two attakers are either both exeuting W or both
exeuting H. A random seletion was made, and in this ase resulted in the wrong hypothe-
sis being seleted. Nevertheless, a violation of the teamwork relationships was deteted, as
neither H or W agrees with the sout's J.
However, as the last olumn of ase 4 shows (in Table 2), the diagnosis proedures are
sensitive to the seletion of the team-modeling hypothesis. The hypothesis used in this ase
does not orretly reet the true state of the agents, and so despite the sout's suess to
detet a failure in this ase, the diagnosis proedures fail to provide orret diagnosis (the
diagnosis was suessful in the two other failure ases). This phenomenon repeats in other
empirial results we provide below: diagnosis failed whenever the hypothesis hosen was
inorret, although it was suient for detetion. We intend to explore ways to improve
the auray of the hypotheses in future work, and therefore will not address this issue
in this paper anymore. The failure detetion apabilities are a signiant improvement in
themselves, sine the agents know with ertainty that a failure has ourred, even if their
diagnosis of it is inorret.
Many soial and physial failures are suessfully aptured using the team-oherene
heuristi for monitoring seletivity. In fat, in our permutations of Example 2, no matter
whih one of the agents was the monitor, all failures to maintain relationship (i.e., all physial
failures exept for one in whih the team remains in agreement) were deteted reliably,
although sometimes diagnosis failed. This result is espeially surprising onsidering that
only a single agent did the monitoring. Previous monitoring methods (ondition monitors
and ommuniations) were unable to detet the failures, despite being used by all three
agents .
Tables 3 and 4 present further empirial results, on the basis of Example 1. Table 3
presents all failure permutations of Example 1 in the same format as Table 1. The normal or-
der of exeution of these plans is as follows: All agents jointly exeute the fly-flight-plan
(F) plan until they detet the way-point. They then swith to the wait-at-point (W) plan,
in whih the two attakers land while the sout ontinues to y ahead to identify the enemy.
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The failures here are all on the part of the agents to detet the way-point, and thus to swith
to the W plan.
Case Atual Exeuting Plans Relationship Failure Physial
# Attaker A1 Attaker A2 Sout A3 Ourred? Failure
1 W W W - -
2 F W W + A1 vision fails
3 W F W + A2 vision fails
4 F F W + A1, A2 vision fails
5 W W F + A3 vision fails
6 F W F + A1, A3 vision fails
7 W F F + A2, A3 vision fails
8 F F F - A1,2,3 vision fails
Table 3: All failure permutations of the undeteted way-point senario (Example 1).
Case A1's Hypothesized Exeuting Plans Relationship Failure Detetion
# Attaker A1 Attaker A2 Sout A3 Deteted? Class
1 W W W - True Negative
2 F W F + True Positive
3 W F W + True Positive
4 F F F - False Negative
5 W W W - False Negative
6 F W F + True Positive
7 W F F + True Positive
8 F F F - True Negative
Table 4: Attaker's (A1) monitoring results in all permutations of Example 1.
Table 4 present the monitoring results for all permutations of Example 1. Here the
attaker A1 is monitoring the team using again a maximally team-oherent hypothesis in
deteting failures. The results show that A1 is suessful in deteting all teamwork failures
but two (ases 4-5, highlighted in bold fae).
These two false outomes are both false negatives. In both these ases, the monitoring
attaker A1 piked an inorret hypothesis for the sout, sine the sout's ations lead to
ambiguous interpretations. The sout is to y forward (to sout the enemy) if it deteted the
way-point (plan W), but also if it did not (then it would be ying in formationplan F). The
use of the maximal team-oherene heuristi auses A1 to prefer a hypothesis in whih the
sout is in agreement with the attakers when in fat it is not. For example, in ase 4, the two
attakers have failed to detet the way-point and are exeuting F. Observing the sout, the
monitoring attaker A1 is not sure whether the sout is exeuting F or W. However, believing
that the sout is exeuting F results in a maximally-oherent team-modeling hypothesis (all
the agents are in agreement), while believing that the sout is exeuting W results in a less
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oherent hypothesis. Thus A1 selets a wrong hypothesis, whih in this ase fails to detet
the teamwork failure.
The maximal team-oherene heuristi an detet failures despite using inorret hy-
potheses. Unfortunately, suh hypotheses an also lead to false-negatives as we have seen in
Table 4. However, none of our experiments resulted in a false-positive result, i.e., a result
in whih the system deteted a failure but in reality none had ourred. Thus the heuristi
provided sound results in these ases. We are able to formally prove this property holds in
general when the maximal team-oherene heuristi is used.
First, we address a matter of notation. Let an agent A monitor an agent B, whih is
exeuting some plan P . We denote by M(A;B=P ) the set of agent-modeling hypotheses
that A's agent-modeling omponent onstruts based on B's observable behavior during the
exeution of P . In other words, M(A;B=P ) is A's set of all plans that math B's observable
behavior. Note that when A monitors itself, it has diret aess to its own state and so
M(A;A=P ) =fPg. Using the modeling notation, we make the following denitions whih
ground our assumptions about the underlying knowledge used in monitoring:
Denition 3. Given a monitoring agent A, and a monitored agent B, we say that A's
agent-modeling of agent B is omplete if for any plan P that may be exeuted by B, P 2
M(A;B=P ).
The setM(A;B=P ) will typially inlude other mathing hypotheses besides the orret
hypothesis P, but is guaranteed to inlude P. Following this denition of individual agent-
modeling ompleteness, we an dene group-wide team-modeling ompleteness:
Denition 4. Let A be an agent monitoring a team T of agents B
1
;    ; B
n
. We say that
A's team-modeling of the team T is omplete if A's agent-modeling of eah of B
1
;    ; B
n
is
omplete.
Denition 4 is ritial to guarantee the apabilities we will explore analytially in this
setion and the next. It generally holds in our use of RESL in the ModSAF and RoboCup
domains, and we make it expliit here in servie of appliations of the tehniques in other
domains.
Armed with these denitions, we now formalize the failure detetion apabilities sug-
gested by the empirial evidene in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Let a monitoring agent A monitor a simple team T . If A's team-modeling
of T is omplete, and A uses a maximally team-oherent hypothesis for detetion, then the
teamwork failure detetion results are sound.
Proof. We will show that if no failure has ourred, none will be deteted, and thus that any
failure that is deteted is in fat a failure. Let a
1
; : : : ; a
n
be the agent members of T . Eah
agent a
i
is exeuting some plan P
i
(1  i  n). Thus olletively, the group is exeuting
(P
1
; : : : ; P
n
). If no failure has ourred, then all the agents are exeuting the same plan P
0
,
i.e., 8i; P
i
= P
0
. Sine A's team-modeling is omplete, the orret hypothesis (P
0
; : : : ; P
0
)
is going to be in the set of team-modeling hypotheses H. Sine it is a maximally team-
oherent hypothesis, either it will be seleted, or that a dierent hypothesis of the same
oherene level will be seleted. Any hypothesis with the same oherene level as the orret
one implies no failure is deteted. Thus the detetion proedure is sound.
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Despite unertainty in the knowledge used, sound failure-detetion an be guaranteed using
the maximal team-oherene heuristi. This is one answer to the monitoring seletivity
problem. However, as we have seen in Table 4, some failures may pass undeteted using this
heuristi (i.e., it may result in false-negatives). Detetion using maximal team-oherene
may therefore unfortunately be inomplete. We may prefer our monitoring system to be
ompleteguaranteed to detet all teamwork failures.
We therefore experimented with the maximal team-inoherene heuristi, the inverse of
the maximal team-oherene heuristi. This heuristi prefers hypotheses that suggest more
failures, rather than less. Table 5 gives the monitoring attaker A1's view of the team,
similar to Table 4, but using a maximally team-inoherent hypothesis. It shows that indeed
using a maximally team-inoherent hypothesis will not lead to the false-negative detetions
in ases 4 and 5 (in ontrast to these ases in Table 4).
Case A1's Hypothesized Exeuting Plans Relationship Failure Detetion
# Attaker A1 Attaker A2 Sout A3 Deteted? Class
1 W H F + False Positive
2 F H W + True Positive
3 W F F + True Positive
4 F F W + True Positive
5 W H F + True Positive
6 F H W + True Positive
7 W F F + True Positive
8 F F W + False Positive
Table 5: Attaker's (A1) monitoring results in all permutations of Example 1, using team-
inoherene.
Guided by these results, we formally show that the team-inoherene heuristi leads to
a detetion proedure that is omplete.
Theorem 2. Let a monitoring agent A monitor a simple team T . If the A's team-modeling
of T is omplete, and A uses a maximally team-inoherent hypothesis for detetion, then the
teamwork failure detetion results are omplete.
Proof. Analogous to that of Theorem 1, the proof is provided in appendix A.
However, these suesses are oset by false positive outomes in ases 1 and 8 of Table 5. In
these ases, no failures have ourred, but the monitoring system falsely reported deteted
failures. In pratie, this may lead to ostly proessing of many false alarms.
Ideally, the detetion apabilities should be sound and omplete. Unfortunately, we an
show that no oherene-based disambiguation sheme exists that results in both sound and
omplete detetion. We show in Theorem 3 that to provide sound and omplete detetion, a
disambiguation method will have to be inonsistent: Given the same set of possible mathing
hypotheses, it will have to sometimes rank one hypothesis on top, and sometimes another.
Theorem 3. Let H be a omplete team-modeling hypotheses set, modeling a simple team.
There does not exists a disambiguation sheme S that (1) uses oherene alone as the basis
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for disambiguation of H, and (2) is deterministi in its seletion, and (3) results in sound
and omplete failure detetion.
Proof. Let S be a disambiguation sheme that leads to omplete and sound detetion and
uses only knowledge of the oherene of the hypotheses in seleting a disambiguated hypoth-
esis. Suppose for ontradition that it is deterministi, and thus onsistent, in its seletion
of an hypothesis out of H, i.e., given H, a set of andidate hypotheses, it applies some
deterministi proedure to hoose one hypothesis based on its oherene. Sine it does
not use any other knowledge outside of the oherene of the andidate hypotheses, given
the same set of andidates, it will always hoose the same hypothesis. Let A
m
be the
monitoring agent using S. Let B be a monitored agent, whose ations are idential when
exeuting team plans P
1
; P
2
. Thus, A
m
annot determine whether B is exeuting P
1
or
P
2
, M(A
m
; B=P
1
) = M(A
m
; B=P
2
) = fP
1
; P
2
g. If A
m
and B are both exeuting P
1
, A
m
's
hypotheses set is
H = f(P
1
; P
1
); (P
1
; P
2
)g
Sine S leads to omplete and sound detetion, it will hoose (P
1
; P
1
). Now, when A
m
and
B are exeuting P
1
and P
2
, respetively, the mathing hypothesis set is again H as dened
above. But now S must selet (P
1
; P
2
). Sine the same set of andidate hypothesis H was
used in eah ase, and no other information was supplied, S must be non-deterministi in
its seletion of a disambiguated hypothesis, ontraditing the assumption.
The empirial and analytial results show that our use of a single disambiguated hypothe-
sis leads to improved, but imperfet, failure-detetion results, ompared to the monitoring
onditions and ommuniations previously used. The empirial results in Tables 2, 4, and
5 establish the benets of the teamwork monitoring tehnique: Most physial failures were
deteted. However, the analytial results (Theorems 1, 2, 3) show that the results are less
than perfet. The algorithms are either sound or omplete, but not both. For omplete mon-
itoring, we would require additional proedures that an dierentiate the true positives from
the false ones, e.g., by foused ommuniation. These proedures are often very expensive.
We an redue the need for ostly veriation by letting go of our insistene on a single
hypothesis, fousing instead of maintaining two hypotheses: a maximally-oherent hypoth-
esis and a maximally-inoherent hypothesis. Table 6 shows a portion of the full set of
team-hypotheses available when the attaker A1 is monitoring the team. The total number
of hypotheses presented in the table is 24, with as many as 4 o-existing in a single ase,
and thus maintaining a full set of hypotheses would be expensive. However, the two inverse
heurististeam-oherene and inoherenerepresent two extremes of the spae of these
hypotheses. If they agree that a failure exists, then a failure atually ourred, sine the
team-oherent hypothesis guarantees soundness (Theorem 1). If they agree that no failure
exists, then no failure took plae, sine the team-inoherent hypothesis guarantees om-
pleteness (Theorem 2). If they disagree (i.e., the team-oherent hypothesis does not imply
a failure, but the team-inoherent hypothesis does), the monitoring system annot be sure
either way, and must revert bak to veriation.
This revised detetion algorithm oers signiant omputational savings ompared to the
single team-inoherent hypothesis approah. It is omplete and unsound, but signiantly
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Case A1's Hypothesized Exeuting Plans Relationship Failure Detetion
# Attaker A1 Attaker A2 Sout A3 Deteted? Class
1 W H F + False Positive
W H W + False Positive
W W F + False Positive
W W W - True Negative
2 F H F + True Positive
F H W + True Positive
F W F + True Positive
F W W + True Positive
3 W F F + True Positive
W F W + True Positive
4 F F W + True Positive
F F F - False Negative
5 W H F + True Positive
W H W + True Positive
W W F + True Positive
W W W - False Negative
6 F H W + True Positive
F H F + True Positive
F W W + True Positive
F W F + True Positive
7 W F F + True Positive
W F W + True Positive
8 F F W + False Positive
F F F - True Negative
Table 6: A portion of the attaker's (A1) monitoring hypotheses and implied results when
no ranking is used to selet a single hypothesis for eah ase.
redues the need for veriation, sine at least when the team-oherent hypothesis implies
failures, veriation is not neessary. It requires representing only two hypotheses, and is
thus still omputationally heaper than maintaining an exponential number of hypotheses.
For example, using a maximally team-inoherent hypothesis on permutations of Example
1 results in a need to verify in all eight ases as we have seen (5). However, when we ombine
suh an hypothesis with a maximally team-oherent hypothesis (e.g., as in Table 4), we only
need to verify four (50% ) of the ases. In ases 2, 3, 6, 7 there is agreement between the
two hypotheses that a failure has ourred, and thus no veriation is required.
A monitoring agent an therefore address the monitoring seletivity problem by balaning
its resoure usage against the guaranteed performane of the monitoring algorithm used.
Either of the simpler single-hypothesis algorithms would utilize only one hypothesis in eah
ase, with detetion apabilities that are guaranteed to be sound or omplete, but not both.
In the more omplex algorithm, two hypotheses would be reasoned about in eah ase, and
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the algorithm would be omplete and require veriation in fewer ases ompared to the
simple-hypothesis omplete algorithm.
5. Monitoring Seletivity in Distributed Teamwork Monitoring
This setion fouses on monitoring seletivity when exploiting a key opportunity for exe-
ution monitoring in multi-agent environmentsit is not only the monitored agents that
are distributed, but the monitoring agents an be distributed as well. We begin with the
simple sheme of seleting a single maximally team-oherent hypothesis. Sine entralized
teamwork monitoring was suessful in addressing all permutations of Example 2, we fous
here on the permutations of Example 1 (Table 3), in whih entralized teamwork monitoring
by the attaker resulted in false-negative detetions (ases 4-5 in Table 4).
In a distributed teamwork monitoring sheme, not only will a single attaker monitor
its teammates, but the sout (and the other attaker) will also engage in monitoring. Table
7 presents the monitoring results of the same failure permutations, with the sout as the
monitoring agent. We nd that the sout suessfully detets the two failure ases that
the attaker failed to detet, ompensating for the attakers' monitoring mistakes. Further-
more, sine the sout used the the maximal-oherene heuristi, detetion is sound and no
veriation is required. The reason for the sout's suess is that the attakers' ations in
this ase, although ambiguous, do not support any hypothesis that an be mathed to the
sout's plan. In other words, regardless of what plan the attakers are exeuting in these
two ases, it is dierent that the plan exeuted by the sout.
Case A3's Hypothesized Exeuting Plans Relationship Failure Detetion
# Attaker A1 Attaker A2 Sout A3 Deteted? Class
1 W W W - True Negative
2 F W F + True Positive
3 W F W + True Positive
4 F F W + True Positive
5 H H F + True Positive
6 F H F + True Positive
7 H F F + True Positive
8 F F F - True Negative
Table 7: Sout's (A3) monitoring results in all permutations of Example 1, using team-
oherene.
Thus if all agents engaged in monitoring in permutations of Example 1, detetion would
be sound and omplete. In all atual failure ases (and only in those) there would at least one
team-member who detets the failure. We attempt to formally dene the general onditions
under whih this phenomenon holds.
Denition 5. We say that two team-plans P
1
; P
2
, have observably-dierent roles R
1
; R
2
if
given an agent B who fullls the roles R
1
; R
2
in the two plans, resp., any monitoring agent
A (dierent than B) will have M(A;B=P
1
) \M(A;B=P
2
) = ;. We then say that B has
observably-dierent roles in P
1
and P
2
, and all B a key agent.
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Intuitively, B is a key agent that has observably dierent roles in the two plans if a
monitoring agent an dierentiate between B's behavior in exeuting P
1
and in exeuting
P
2
. For instane, both attakers have observably dierent roles in F (in whih they y) and
W (in whih they land). However, they do not have observably dierent roles in W and H,
both of whih require them to land. The sout has observably dierent roles in W (ying)
and H (landing).
The key-agent is the basis for the onditions under whih a self-monitoring team will
detet a failure with eah agent using only team-oherene. We rst prove a lemma on the
onditions in whih a single given agent will detet a failure. We then use this lemma to
prove the onditions under whih at least one agent in a given team will detet a failure.
Lemma 1. Suppose a simple team T is self-monitoring (all members of the team monitor
eah other) using the maximally team-oherent heuristi (and under the assumption that for
eah agent, team-modeling is omplete). Let A
1
; A
2
be monitoring agents who are members of
T and are exeuting P
1
; P
2
, respetively. A
1
would detet a failure in maintaining teamwork
relationships with an agent A
2
, if A
2
is a key-agent in P
1
; P
2
.
Proof. See appendix A.
A
1
knows that it is exeuting P
1
. If A
2
is exeuting P
2
, and is a key-agent in P
1
and P
2
,
then A
1
is guaranteed to notie that a dierene exists between itself and A
2
, sine A
2
is
ating observably dierent than it would if it had been exeuting P
1
. Note, however, that
A
2
may or may not detet this dierene, sine from A
2
's perspetive, A
1
's behavior may
or may not be explained by P
2
. A
2
will detet a dierene only if A
1
's roles in P
1
and P
2
are also observably-dierent. However, sine A
1
has deteted the failure, it an now alert
its teammates, diagnose the failure, or hoose orretive ation.
If we want to guarantee that a teamwork failure will always be deteted by at least
one agent, we must make sure that in eah possible ombination of plans, there has to be
at least one key-agent whose roles are observably dierent. The lemma shows that other
agents monitoring this agent will notie a failure if one ours. To this aim, we dene an
observably-partitioned set of plans employed by a team.
Denition 6. A set P of team-plans is said to be observably-partitioned if for any two plans
P
i
; P
j
2 P there exists a key-agent A
ij
. The set of these A
ij
agents is alled the key agents
set of P .
For instane, the set of team-plans our heliopter pilots team has been using in the
examples (Fly-Flight-Plan (F), Wait-at-Point (W), Ordered-Halt (H), and Join-Sout
(J)) is observably-partitioned. The attakers land in W and H, but y in F and J. The sout
lands in J and H, but ies in W and F. Table 8 shows whih agents have observably dierent
roles in any two plans in the set. For instane, by nding the ell at the intersetion of the
H row and the W olumn, we nd that the sout has observably dierent roles in these two
plans. Indeed, the sout lands when a ommand is reeived to halt exeution (H), but ies
out to sout the enemy's position when exeuting W. Here, sine all agents have observably-
dierent roles in at least two plans, the key agents set of { W, F, H, J } inludes all members
of the teamattakers and sout.
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Fly-Flight-Plan (F) Wait-at-Point (W) Ordered-Halt (H) Join-Sout (J)
F - Attakers Attakers Sout
W Attakers - Sout Sout and Attakers
H Attakers Sout - Attakers
J Sout Sout and Attakers Attakers -
Table 8: Observable partitioning of the heliopter pilot team in ModSAF.
Theorem 4. If a simple team (1) employs an observably-partitioned set of team-plans O,
and all team-members monitor members of the key agents set of O, (2) using omplete team-
modeling and (3) maximally team-oherent hypotheses, then the teamwork failure detetion
results are sound and omplete.
Proof. From theorem 1 we know that detetion would be sound. To show that it is omplete,
we will prove at least one agent will detet a dierene between itself and others whenever
team-members are not all exeuting the same plan (i.e., a failure is ourring). Suppose the
team is urrently divided on the team-plans that must be exeuted, i.e., there are agents
a
i
; a
j
in the team that are exeuting team plans P
i
; P
j
, respetively, suh that P
i
6= P
j
.
Thus a failure has ourred. Let K be the key agents set of O. Sine the team is observably-
partitioned, for P
i
; P
j
there exists at least one key agent a
1
2 K. There are three ases:
ase (i). a
1
is exeuting P
i
. In this ase any agent exeuting P
j
would detet a dierene
with a
1
and would therefore detet the failure (lemma 1).
ase (ii). a
1
is exeuting P
j
. In this ase any agent exeuting P
i
would detet a dierene
with a
1
and would therefore detet the failure (lemma 1).
ase (iii). a
1
is exeuting some other plan Q. Its roles must be observably dierent in Q
and P
i
, or in Q and P
j
(or in both), and thus any agent exeuting P
j
and/or P
i
would detet
the failure. The ase that a
1
's roles are not observably dierent in Q and P
i
and in Q and
P
j
is impossible, sine then for a monitoring agent A
m
M(A
m
; a
1
=P
i
) \M(A
m
; a
1
=Pj)  fQg 6= ;
Contraditing a
1
being a key agent for P
i
; P
j
.
Sine in all three ases, at least one agent would detet a failure where one ourred.
Therefore, failure detetion is omplete. Sine it is also sound as we have seen, detetion is
sound and omplete.
The theorem shows that distributed teamwork monitoring an result in sound and omplete
failure-detetion, while using a simple algorithm. Eah team-member monitors only the key
agents
2
, using a maximally team-oherent hypothesis. If it detets a failure, then ertainly
one has ourred. If no agent detets a failure, then indeed no failure has ourred.
This simple distributed algorithm, with its attention-fousing features and guaranteed
soundness and ompleteness ontrasts with the more omplex entralized algorithm whih
we disussed in the previous setion (Setion 4). The algorithm's eetiveness relies on the
2. If the monitoring team-member does not know who the key agents are, but knows they exist, it an
monitor all other team-members. This inreases monitoring, but sound and omplete failure detetion
is still guaranteed.
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ondition of an observably-partitioned set of plans, and on the distribution of the monitoring.
A orollary of Theorems 3 and 4 is that if key agents are not available in the distributed
ase, failure detetion is either sound or omplete, but not both. And even when key agents
are available, entralized teamwork monitoring is still not omplete and sound.
Fortunately, observable-partitioning is not a diult property to design: Teams are very
often omposed suh that not all agents have the same role in the same plan, and in general,
roles do have observable dierenes between them. For instane, our heliopter pilot team
in the ModSAF domain typially exeutes a set of plans with this property, as Table 8
demonstrates.
If the team, however, is not observably-partitioned, there may be a ase where two agents
are eah exeuting a dierent plan, but no agent will be able to detet it using the team-
oherene heuristi. The minimal ase where this ours is when two agents, A
1
and A
2
are
exeuting plans P
1
and P
2
, respetively, and P
1
and P
2
are not observably dierent, suh
that
M(A
2
; A
1
=P
1
) \M(A
1
; A
2
=P2) = fP
1
; P
2
g
This will result in A
1
and A
2
eah believing that the other is in agreement with them. A
hek for suh a situation an be made a part of the plan design proess, marking risky
points in the exeution in whih detetion is either sound or omplete (Theorem 3), and
veriation (e.g., by ommuniations) an be presribed pro-atively. Or, the hek ould
be inserted into the protool for run-time analysisthe agent would simulate the other's
hypotheses mathing their own ations, and detet risky points dynamially.
6. Using Soially-Attentive Monitoring in an O-Line Conguration
To further demonstrate the generality of our soially-attentive monitoring framework, this
setion examines re-use of teamwork monitoring in domains in whih diagnosis and reovery
from every failure are infeasible during exeution. Examples of suh domains inlude team
sports, military human team training (Volpe, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1996), and other
multi-agent domains. The dynami nature of the domain, hard real-time deadlines, and
omplexity of the agents involved (e.g., human team members) make diagnosis and reovery
diult. Even if a failure an be diagnosed, it is often too late for eetive reovery. In
suh environments, the monitoring agent is often onerned with trends of performane.
This information is important for long-term design evaluation and analysis, and need not
neessarily be alulated on-line. The results of the analysis are meant as feedbak to the
agents' designer (oah or supervisor, for humans).
To this end, we are developing an o-line soially-attentive monitoring system alled
Teamore (TEAmwork MOnitoring REview). Teamore urrently uses exeution traes of
the monitored agents to perform the monitoring, rather than using plan reognition. Thus it
does not need to worry about the unertainty in plan-reognition, nor about real-time per-
formane. Instead, it knows with ertainty eah agent's plans during exeution. Teamore
aumulates several quantitative measures related to teamwork, inluding the Average-Time-
to-Agreement measure (ATA, for short), and a measure of the level of agreement in a team.
These build on the failure detetion algorithm, but aggregate failures in quantitatively. We
fous here on the ATA measure.
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Teamore denes a swith as the time interval beginning at the point where any team-
member (at least one) selets a new team plan for exeution by the team, and ending
at the point where the team is again in agreement on the team-plan being exeuted. In
perfet teamwork, all team-members selet a new team-plan jointly, and so always remain
in agreement. In more realisti senario, some agents will take longer to swith, and so
initially a teamwork failure will our. The rst team-member to selet a new plan will be
in disagreement with some of its teammates, until either it rejoins them in exeuting the
original plan, or they join it in seleting the new plan. Suh a swith begins with a deteted
failure and ends when no more failures are deteted.
Figure 6 shows an illustration of a swith. The three agents begin in an initial state of
agreement on joint exeution of Plan 1 (lled line). Agent 1 is the rst agent to swith to
Plan 2 (dotted line), and is followed by Agent 3, and nally Agent 2. The swith is the
interval whih begins at the instane Agents 1 seleted Plan 2, to the time all three agents
regained their agreement (but this time on Plan 2).
Legend:  
Plan 1
Plan 2
Agent 3
Agent 2
Agent 1
Time
A Switch
Figure 6: An illustration of a swith. The three agents swith from plan 1 to plan 2.
Teamore keeps trak of the lengths of time in whih failures are deteted until they
are resolved. The ATA measure is the average swith length (in time tiks) per a omplete
team run (e.g., a mission in ModSAF, a game in RoboCup). A perfet team would have
all swithes of length zero, and therefore an ATA of 0. The worst team would be one that
from the very beginning of their task exeution to the very end of it, would not agree on
the team plan being exeuted. For instane, eah RoboCup game lasts for 6000 tiks. The
worst possible team would have only one swith during the game, of length 6000. Thus the
ATA sale in RoboCup goes from 0 (perfet) to 6000 (worst).
We used the ATA measure to analyze a series of games of our two RoboCup simulation-
league teams, ISIS'97 and ISIS'98 (Marsella et al., 1999) against a xed opponent, Andhill'97
(Andou, 1998). In these games, we varied the use of ommuniations by our teams to
evaluate design deisions on the use of ommuniations. In approximately half of the games,
players were allowed to use ommuniations in servie of teamwork. In the other half, all
ommuniations between agents were disabled. ISIS'97 played approximately 15 games in
eah settings, and ISIS'98 played 30 games in eah ommuniation settings.
Table 9 shows the mean ATA values over these games, for two sub-teams (eah having
three members) of ISIS'97 and ISIS'98 (ATA values are alulated separately for eah sub-
team). The rst olumn shows whih sub-team the results refer to in eah row. The seond
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olumns shows the mean ATA for eah sub-team, when no ommuniations were used. The
third olumn shows the mean ATA when ommuniations were used. The next olumn shows
the size of the ATA redutionthe drop in the mean ATA values when ommuniations are
introdued. The last olumn shows the probability of the null hypothesis in a two-tailed
t-test of the dierene in the ATA means. This is the probability that the dierene is due
to hane, thus smaller numbers indiate greater signiane.
ISIS Mean ATA Mean ATA ATA t-test prob.
sub-team No omm. Comm. Redution null-hypothesis
'97 Goalies 32.80 5.79 27.01 7.13e-13
'97 Defenders 57.5 6.81 50.69 .45e-10
'98 Goalies 13.28 3.65 9.63 9.26e-16
'98 Defenders 12.99 3.98 9.01 7.13e-5
Table 9: Average-Time-to-Agreement (ATA) for games against Andhill'97.
Clearly, a very signiant dierene emerges between the ommuniating and non-
ommuniating versions of eah sub-team. The ATA values indiate that sharing infor-
mation by way of ommuniations signiantly dereases the time it takes team-members
to ome to agreement on a seleted plan. This result agrees with our intuitions about the
role of ommuniations, and in that sense, may not be surprising.
However, the ATA redution magnitudes indiate that ISIS'98 may be muh less sensi-
tive to loss of ommuniations than ISIS'97. The dierenes in ATA values for ISIS'97 are
approximately triple, nearly four times, as great as for ISIS'98. Our explanation for this
phenomenon is that ISIS'98 is omposed of players with improved apabilities for monitor-
ing the environment (suh that they have better knowledge of the environment). ISIS'98
is therefore not as dependent on ommuniations as are teams, suh as ISIS'97, omposed
of players with lesser environment monitoring apabilities. ISIS'98 players are better able
to selet the orret plan without relying on their teammates. Thus, they would be able
to maintain the same level of performane when ommuniations are not used. In ontrast,
ISIS'97 players rely on passing information to and from eah other (monitoring eah other)
through ommuniations, and so took muh longer to establish agreement when ommuni-
ations were not available.
We an validate the hypothesis suggested by ATA measurements by looking at the overall
team-performane in the games, measured by the sore dierene at the end of the game.
Table 10 shows the mean sore dierene from the same series of games against Andhill'97.
The rst olumn lists the ommuniations settings (with or without). The seond and
third olumns show the mean sore-dierene in the games for ISIS'97 and ISIS'98. The
bottom row summarizes the results of t-tests run on eah set of games, to determine the
signiane level of the dierene between the mean sore-dierenes. The sore-dierene
results orroborate the ATA results. While the dierene in mean sore-dierene is indeed
statistially signiant in ISIS'97 games, it is not signiant in ISIS'98 games. This supports
our explanation that the more situationally aware ISIS'98 is indeed better able to handle
loss of ommuniations than ISIS'97.
131
Kaminka and Tambe
ISIS'97 ISIS'98
Communiation Used -3.38 -1.53
Communiation Not Used -4.36 -2.13
t-test p/null hypothesis p=0.032 p=0.13
Table 10: ISIS'97 and ISIS'98 mean sore dierene against Andhill'97, with hanging om-
muniations settings
The general lesson emerging from these experiments is that a trade-o exists in address-
ing the monitoring seletivity problem. The knowledge that is maintained about teammates
(here, via ommuniations) an be traded, to an extent, with knowledge maintained about
the environment. A designer therefore has a range of alternative apabilities that it an
hoose for its agents. Dierent domains may better failitate impliit oordination by mon-
itoring the environment, while others require agents to rely on ommuniations or expliit
knowledge of team-members to handle the oordination.
The ATA results support additional onlusions, espeially when ombined with a general
performane measure suh as the sore-dierene. To illustrate, onsider the plots of the
atual data from these games. Figure 7 plots all the ATA values for all four variants, for
the Goalies sub-team. The graph plots approximately 60 data-points. We see in Figure
7 that when ommuniations are used, ISIS'97's ATA values are still generally better than
ISIS'98's ATA without ommuniations. Thus, despite its importane, individual situational
awareness is not able to fully ompensate for lak of ommuniations.
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Figure 7: ATA values for the Goalies sub-teams in games against Andhill'97.
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Teamore demonstrates the reuse of the teamwork monitoring tehniques developed in
earlier setions in an o-line onguration. The designer of ISIS'97 should set its agents to
use ommuniations, sine those will have signiant improvement on the sore-dierene.
In ontrast, with or without ommuniations, ISIS'98 players are able to maintain their
ollaboration. Thus if ommuniations takes preious resoures, it an be relatively safely
eliminated from the ISIS'98 agents' design, and the development eorts an be direted at
some other omponents of the agents.
7. Beyond Teamwork
We have presented a general soially-attentive monitoring framework to detet failures in
maintaining agreement on joint team plans. However, eetive operation in teams often
relies on additional relationships, whih we briey address in this setion.
7.1 A Riher Agreement Model: Agreeing to Disagree
The teamwork model requires joint exeution of team plans. In servie of suh agreed-upon
joint plans, agents may sometimes agree to exeute dierent sub-plans individually, or split
into sub-teams to exeute dierent sub-team plans. Two examples may serve to illustrate.
Example 3. In the ModSAF domain, heliopters engage the enemy by repeatedly following
the following three steps: hiding behind a hill or trees (masking), then popping up (unmask-
ing), then shooting missiles at the enemy, and bak to hiding. In some variations of this
plan, they are required to make sure that no two heliopters are shooting at the same time.
Of ourse, due to limits of ommuniations, heliopters do fail and unmask at the same time.
Example 4. In the RoboCup domain, our 11 players in both ISIS'97 and ISIS'98 (Marsella
et al., 1999) are divided into four sub-teams: mid-elders, attakers, defenders, and goalies
(the goalie and two lose defenders). This division into sub-teams is modeled by the agents
seleting one of four team plans in servie of the play team plan (see Figure 8). Mid-elders
must selet the midfield plan, goalies must selet the defend-goal plan, et. Again, ideally
an attaker would never selet any other plan but attak, a defender would selet no other
plan but defend, et. However, due to ommuniation failures, players may sometimes
aidently abandon their intended sub-team, and exeute a team-plan of another sub-team.
[Win−Game]
[Play] [Interrupt]
...
[Attack] [Defend] [Midfield] [Defend−Goal]
[Simple
Advance] [FlankAttack]
Score−goal Pass
[Careful−
defense]
[Simple−goal
defense]
Intercept kick−out Reposition
...
......
...........
.....
.....
Figure 8: A Portion of the plan-hierarhy used by ISIS RoboCup agents.
In both of these examples, ertain dierenes between agents are agreed upon and are a
sign of orret exeution, not of failure. Indeed, it is the lak of dierene in seleted plans
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that would indiate failure in these ases. We use the term mutual-exlusion oordination to
refer to these relationships. In Example 3, ideally no two pilots are exeuting the shooting
plan at the same time. In Example 4, no two members of dierent sub-teams (e.g., an
attaker and a defender) are exeuting the same plan in servie of play (e.g., defend). As the
examples demonstrate, there is a lear need for monitoring mutual-exlusion oordination.
Our results of previous setions are re-used in servie of soially-attentive monitoring of
mutual-exlusion relationships. They require a transformation both in implementation and
theory. The hierarhies are ompared in the usual manner, exept that failures are signied
by equalities, rather than dierenes. For instane, if an attaker is staying in the team's
own half of the eld, its teammates may ome to suspet that it mistakenly defeted the
attakers' sub-team and believes itself to be a defender.
The analytial results are inverted as well. The maximal team-oherene heuristi will
now lead to ompleteness, sine it prefers hypotheses that ontain equalities among agents,
whih are failures in mutual-exlusion oordination. The maximal team-inoherene heuris-
ti will now lead to sound detetion, as it prefers hypotheses that imply no equalities have
ourred. These properties an be proven formally.
Theorem 5. Let a monitoring agent A monitor mutual-exlusion relationships in a group
of agents G. If A's modeling of G is omplete, and A uses a maximally team-inoherent
hypothesis for detetion, then the failure detetion results are sound.
Proof. Provided in appendix A.
Theorem 6. Let a monitoring agent A monitor mutual-exlusion relationships in a group
of agents G. If A's modeling of G is omplete, and A uses a maximally team-oherent
hypothesis for detetion, then the failure detetion results are omplete.
Proof. Provided in appendix A.
Thus in mutual-exlusion relationships, as in teamwork relationships, guaranteed failure-
detetion results may still be provided despite the use of limited, unertain knowledge
about monitored agents. The entralized teamwork monitoring algorithms an now be eas-
ily transformed for monitoring mutual-exlusion relationships. Unfortunately, the results in
the distributed ase (Theorem 4) annot be so easily transformed, sine they rely on the
property of observable-partitioning, whih is assoiated with dierenes, not with equalities.
We leave this issue for future work.
7.2 Monitoring Using Role-Similarity Relationships
This setion applies soially-attentive monitoring to role-similarity relationships, for moni-
toring individual performane within teams. In partiular, in servie of team-plans agents
may selet individual sub-plans, whih do not neessitate agreement by team-members, but
are onstrained by the agents' roles. For instane, in servie of exeuting the team-plan
fly-flight-plan (Figure 3) pilots individually selet their own individual plans whih set
the veloity and heading within the onstraints of the formation and ight method speied
in the mission.
Role similarity relationships speify the ways in whih given individual plans are similar,
and to what extent. Two agents of the same role who are exeuting dissimilar plans an
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be onsidered to be in violation of the role-similarity relationships. This enables a soially-
attentive monitoring system to detet failure in role-exeution. To monitor individual plans
the agent is exeuting, it ompares its seletion with that of other agents of the same role,
similarly to the method we used for teamwork. If the plans are onsidered similar by the
role-similarity relationship model, no failure is deteted. Otherwise, a failure may have
ourred, and the diagnosis omponent is alled to verify it and provide an explanation.
Let us illustrate with a failure from the ModSAF domain whih our system was able to
detet using the role-similarity relationship:
Example 5. A team of three heliopters was to take o from the base and head out on a
mission. However, one of the pilot agents failed to orretly proess the mission statement.
It therefore kept its heliopter hovering above the base, while its teammates left to exeute
the mission by themselves.
This failures was deteted using role-similarity relationship monitoring. The agreed-upon
team-plan was seleted by all the agents, and so no problem with teamwork relationship was
deteted. This team-plan involved eah agent then seleting individual methods of ight,
whih determine altitude and veloity. Here the agents diered. The failing heliopter
remained hovering, while its teammates moved forward. Using a role similarity relationship,
the failing heliopter ompared its own seleted plan to that of its teammate (who shared its
role of a subordinate in the formation), and realized that their plans were dissimilar enough
to announe a possible failure.
Unfortunately, the atual similarity metris seem to be domain- and task-spei, and
thus are not as easy to re-use aross domains. Furthermore, deteted failures are not ne-
essarily real failures, nor do all deteted failures have the same weight. We are urrently
investigating ways to address these hallenging issues.
8. Related Work
Our investigation of soially-attentive monitoring, and the relationship between knowledge
maintained of agents' states and monitoring eetiveness builds on researh in dierent sub-
elds of multi-agent systems. We address these sub-elds in this setion, and explain how
our investigation is related to existing literature.
8.1 Related Work on Teamwork
Previous work in teamwork has reognized that monitoring other agents is ritial to teams.
Past investigations have raised the monitoring seletivity problem, but have not addressed
it in depth. Building upon these investigations, this paper begins to provide some in-depth
answers to this problem.
The theory of SharedPlans (Grosz & Kraus, 1996, 1999) touhes on the teamwork moni-
toring seletivity problem in several ways, but provides only some initial answers. First, the
theory requires agents to know that their teammates are apable of arrying out their tasks
in the team. The authors note that agents must ommuniate enough about their plans
to onvine their teammates of their ability to arry out ations (Grosz & Kraus, 1996,
p. 314). Seond, the theory requires agents to have mutual-belief in the shared reipe, a
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state that requires agents to reason to innite reursion about other agent's beliefs. Un-
fortunately, attainment of mutual belief is undeidable in theory (Halpern & Moses, 1990)
and hene must be approximated in pratie (Jennings, 1995; Rih & Sidner, 1997). Suh
approximations may still impose strong monitoring requirements. Third, theory introdues
the intention-that onstrut in servie of oordination and helpful behavior, implying mon-
itoring of others' progress to assess the the need for suh behavior (Grosz & Kraus, 1996,
Axiom A5-A7). Fourth, SharedPlans requires that intentions of an agent must not on-
it (Grosz & Kraus, 1996, Axiom A1), and sine some of these intentions (in partiular,
intentions-that) may involve the attitudes of other agents, some monitoring of others to
detet and avoid onits is implied. The authors point out that while theoretially all suh
onits an be deteted, this is infeasible in pratie (Grosz & Kraus, 1996, p. 307). They
suggest that onit detetion and prevention be investigated in a problem-spei manner
within the minimal onstraints (i.e., monitoring for apabilities, mutual-belief, progress, lak
of onits) provided by the SharedPlans framework (p. 308 and 314).
Joint-Intentions (Levesque et al., 1990; Cohen & Levesque, 1991) requires an agent who
privately omes to believe that a joint-goal is either ahieved, unahievable, or irrelevant,
must ommit to having the entire team mutually believe it to be the ase. As in the theory
of SharedPlans, Joint-Intentions' use of mutual belief an only be approximated in pratie,
and imposes strong monitoring requirements. Thus, the monitoring seletivity problem is
raised for pratial implementations of Joint-Intentions.
Jennings has hypothesized that two entral onstruts in ooperative multi-agent oor-
dination are ommitments made by the agents, and onventions, rules used to monitor these
ommitments (Jennings, 1993). Suh onventions are used to deide what information needs
to be monitored about agents, and how it is to be monitored. For instane, a onvention may
require an agent to report to its teammates any hanges it privately detets with respet
to the attainability of the team goal. Jennings raises the monitoring seletivity problem
and provides an example of spei onventions for high- and low-bandwidth situations in
whih some knowledge is not ommuniated to all agents if the bandwidth is not available.
However, Jennings does not explore in-depth the question of how suh onventions are se-
leted, and what are the trade-os and guarantees assoiated with the seletion of partiular
onventions. For instane, there are no guarantees on the eets of using the low-bandwidth
onvention in the example.
The theoretial investigations desribed above all raise the monitoring seletivity prob-
lem (impliitly or expliitly). Our work builds upon these to address this problem in depth,
in the ontext of soially-attentive monitoring in teams. This paper reports on soundness
and/or ompleteness properties of teamwork relationship failure-detetion that an be an-
alytially guaranteed, despite unertainty in knowledge aquired about monitored agents.
The analytial guarantees are appliable to plan-reognition and ommuniations, and are
orroborated by empirial results.
Building on theoretial work, pratial teamwork systems inlude (Jennings, 1995; Rih
& Sidner, 1997) and (Tambe, 1997). Jennings' investigation of the Joint-Responsibility
teamwork model in GRATE* (Jennings, 1995) builds on Joint-Intentions, and similarly to
our own implementation, requires agents to agree on the team-plans whih are to exeute.
However, GRATE* is used in industrial settings in whih foolproof ommuniations an
be assumed (Jennings, 1995, p. 211), and thus only passive monitoring (via ommunia-
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tions) is used. Although Jennings provides an evaluation of GRATE*'s performane with
respet to ommuniation delays, no guarantees are provided with respet to failure de-
tetion. GRATE* maintains knowledge about other agents through aquaintanes models,
whih are used to keep trak of what team-members' apabilities are (in servie of forming
teams). However, the question of how muh knowledge should be used in these models is
left unaddressed.
Rih and Sidner investigate COLLAGEN in a ollaborative user-interfae system, in
whih ommuniations are reliable (Rih & Sidner, 1997). However, from a human-usability
perspetive, limiting the amount of ommuniations is still desirable. To address this is-
sue, reent empirial work by Lesh, Sidner and Rih (1999) utilizes plan reognition in
COLLAGEN; the fous of that work is on using the ollaborative settings to make the
plan-reognition tratable. For instane, ambiguities in plan-reognition may be resolved
by asking the user for lariation. Work on COLLAGEN does not investigate how muh
knowledge is to be maintained for eetive ollaborative dialogue with the user. In ontrast,
we are able to provide guarantees on the failure-detetion results of our algorithms. Also,
analysizing the dialogue plans for risky points may allow systems suh as COLLAGEN to
deide whether to use ommuniations for lariation regardless of plan-reognition ambi-
guity.
STEAM (Tambe, 1997) maintains limited information about the ability of team-members
to arry out their roles. STEAM also allows team-members to reason expliitly about the
ost of ommuniation in deiding whether to ommuniate or not. Our work signiantly
extends these apabilities via plan-reognition, and provides analytially-guaranteed fault-
detetion results. Furthermore, our teamwork failure-detetion apabilities an be useful to
trigger STEAM's re-planning apabilities.
8.2 Related Work on Coordination
Huber (1995) investigated the use of probabilisti plan-reognition in servie of ative team-
work monitoring, motivated by the unreliability and osts of passive ommuniations-based
monitoring in military appliations. Washington explores observation-based oordination us-
ing Markov Models (Washington, 1998), fousing on making the omputations tratable. In
ontrast to Huber and Washington, our work fouses on the monitoring seletivity problem.
We showed strengths and limitations of entralized and distributed approahes that guar-
anteed failure-detetion results using oherene-based disambiguation of plan-reognition
hypotheses.
Durfee (1995) disusses various methods of reduing the amount of knowledge that agents
need to onsider in oordinating with others. The methods disussed involve pruning parts
of the nested models, using ommuniations, using hierarhies and abstrations, et. While
the fous of this work is on methods by whih modeling an be limited, the fous of our
work is on the question of how muh modeling is required for guaranteed performanethe
monitoring seletivity problem. We provide analytial guarantees on trade-os involved in
using limited knowledge of agents for failure-detetion purposes.
Sugawara and Lesser (1998) report on the use of omparative reasoning/analysis teh-
niques in servie of learning and speializing oordination rules for a system in whih dis-
tributed agents oordinate in diagnosing a faulty network. The investigation is foused on
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optimizing oordination rules to minimize ineieny and redundany in the agent's oor-
dinating messages. Upon deteting sub-optimal oordination (via a fault model), the agents
exhange information on their loal views of the system and the problem solving ativity,
and onstrut a global view. They then ompare the loal view to the global view to nd
ritial values/attributes whih were missing from the loal view and therefore gave rise to
the sub-optimal performane problem. These values and attributes are used in onstruting
situation-spei rules that optimize oordination in partiular situations. For example,
network diagnosis agents may learn a rule that guides them to hoose a oordination strat-
egy in whih only one agent performs the diagnosis and shares its result with the rest of
the diagnosis agents. Our work on soially-attentive monitoring similarly uses omparison
between agents views to drive the monitoring proess. However, our use of omparison is
a produt of the relationship we are monitoring. While Sugawara and Lesser's work an
be viewed as letting the agents inrementally optimize their monitoring requirements, our
results analytially explore the level of monitoring required for eetive failure-detetion, in
dierent ongurations. Our teamwork monitoring tehnique addresses unertainty in the
aquired information, and does not onstrut a global view of all attributes the systemas
that would be extremely expensive. Instead, our tehnique fouses on triggering failure de-
tetion via ontrasting of plans, then inrementally expanding the searh for dierenes in
the diagnosis proess.
Robotis literature has also raised the monitoring seletivity problem. Parker (1993)
investigated the monitoring seletivity problem from a dierent perspetive, for a formation-
maintenane task. She empirially examined the eets of ombining soially-attentive in-
formation (whih she referred to as loal) and knowledge of the team's goals, and onludes
that the most fault-tolerant strategy is one where the agents monitor eah other as well as
progress towards the goals. Kuniyoshi et al. (Kuniyoshi, Rougeaux, Ishii, Kita, Sakane,
& Kakikura, 1994) present a framework for ooperation by observations, in whih robots
visually attend to others as a prerequisite to oordination. The framework presents several
standard attentional templates, i.e., who monitors whom. They dene a team attentional
struture as one in whih all agents monitor eah other. Our work fouses on the mon-
itoring seletivity problem within soially-attentive monitoring of teamwork relationships,
and provides analytial as well as empirial results. We treat the attentional templates as
a produt of the relationships that hold in the system. Our results show that monitoring in
teams may not neessarily require monitoring all team-members.
8.3 Other Related Work
Horling et al. (Horling, Lesser, Vinent, Bazzan, & Xuan, 1999) present a distributed
diagnosis system for a multi-agent intelligent home environment.The system uses fault-
models to identify failures and ineienies in omponents, and to guide reovery. Shroeder
and Wagner (1997) proposed a distributed diagnosis tehnique in whih ooperating agents
reeive requests for tests and diagnoses, and send responses to other agents. They eah
onstrut a global diagnosis based on the loal ones they produe and reeivewith the
assumption that no onits will our. Frohlih and Nejdl (1996) investigates a sheme
in whih multiple diagnosis agents ooperate via a blakboard arhiteture in diagnosing a
physial system. The agents may use dierent diagnosis models or systems, but a entralized
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onit-resolution agent is employed to handle any onits in diagnoses found. All three
approahes do not address the monitoring seletivity problem.
There are a few soial measures related to the ATA. Goldberg and Matari (1997) in-
vestigate a multi-robot foraging task and measure interferenethe amount of time robots
spend avoiding eah other. Balh (1998) uses soial entropy (Bailey, 1990) to measure be-
havioral diversity in multi-agent tasks of soer, foraging, and formation-maintenane. Both
investigations fous on haraterizing heterogeneity in multi-agent systems and its relation
to performane. In ontrast, the fous of our work is on providing useful feedbak to the
designer. Possible orrelation between task performane and ATA values remains to be
investigated.
9. Conlusions and Future Work
The work presented in this paper is motivated by pratial onerns. We have begun our
investigation of the monitoring seletivity problem as a result of our observation that failures
ontinue to our despite our agents' use of monitoring onditions and ommuniations.
Analysis of the failures revealed that agents were not suiently informed about eah other's
state. While the need to monitor one's teammates has been reognized repeatedly in the past
(Jennings, 1993; Grosz & Kraus, 1996; Tambe, 1997), the monitoring seletivity problem
the question of how muh monitoring is requiredremained largely unaddressed (Jennings,
1993; Grosz & Kraus, 1996).
We provide key answers to the monitoring seletivity problem. Within the ontext of
soially-attentive monitoring in teams, we demonstrate that teamwork relationship failures
an be deteted eetively even with unertain, limited, knowledge of team-members' states.
We show analytially that entralized ative teamwork monitoring provides failure-detetion
that is either omplete and unsound, or sound and inomplete. However, entralized team-
work monitoring requires multiple hypotheses and monitoring of all team-members. In
ontrast, distributed ative teamwork monitoring results in omplete and sound failure-
detetion, despite using a simpler algorithm and monitoring only key agents in a team.
Using an implemented general framework for soially-attentive monitoring, we empiri-
ally validate these results in the ModSAF domain. We also provide initial results in mon-
itoring mutual-exlusion and role-similarity relationships, and initial diagnosis proedures.
We further demonstrate the generality of the framework by applying it in the RoboCup
domain, in whih we show how useful quantitative analysis an be generated o-line. Both
ModSAF and RoboCup are dynami, omplex, multi-agent domains that involve many un-
ertainties in pereption and ation.
We attempted to demonstrate how the results and tehniques an be applied in other
domains. We have expliitly pointed out neessary onditions for the theorems to hold,
suh as observable-partitioning and team-modeling ompleteness. The presented diagnosis
algorithm is sensitive to the auray of the knowledge used, and may require assuming that
plans an be reognized as soon as they are seleted. These onditions should be veried by
the designer in the target appliation domain. Reative plans (our hosen representation) are
ommonly used in many dynami multi-agent domains. Our fous on monitoring agreements
on joint plans stems from the entrality of similar notions of agreement in agent and human
teamwork literature (Jennings, 1995; Grosz & Kraus, 1996; Volpe et al., 1996; Tambe, 1997).
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We made several referenes to additional areas in whih we would like to ondut further
investigations. One important topi whih we plan to investigate in depth is the strong
requirements of the distributed teamwork monitoring algorithm in terms of observability. In
order to provide its soundness and ompleteness guarantees, the distributed algorithm relies
on the ability of all team-members to monitor the key agents. We are investigating ways
to relax this requirement while still providing guaranteed results. In addition, the diagnosis
proedures should be extended and formalized, and we would like to investigate ways to
alleviate the sensitivity of these proedures to the hoie of team-modeling hypothesis.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Theorem. (# 2, page 123). Let a monitoring agent A monitor a simple team T . If A's
team-modeling of T is omplete, and A uses a maximally team-oherent hypothesis for de-
tetion, then the teamwork failure detetion results are sound.
Proof. We will show that any failure that ours is deteted, and thus that all failures will
be deteted. Let a
1
; : : : ; a
n
be the agent members of T . Eah agent a
i
is exeuting some
plan P
i
(1  i  n). Thus olletively, the group is exeuting (P
1
; : : : ; P
n
). If a failure
has ourred, then there are two agents a
k
; a
j
; 1  j; k  n suh that a
j
is exeuting plan
P
j
and a
k
is exeuting plan P
k
and P
j
6= P
k
. Sine A's team-modeling is omplete, the
orret hypothesis (P
1
; : : : ; P
j
; : : : ; P
k
; : : : P
n
) will in the set of team-modeling hypotheses.
Sine A will hoose a maximally team-inoherent hypothesis, either it will hoose the orret
hypothesis, whih is more inoherent than a hypothesis implying no failure has ourred, or
that it will selet a hypothesis with greater inoherene hypothesis (or equivalent level). In
any ase, a failure would be deteted, and the detetion proedure is omplete.
Lemma. (# 1, page 127). Suppose a simple team T is self-monitoring (all members of
the team monitor eah other) using the maximally team-oherent heuristi (and under the
assumption that for eah agent, team-modeling is omplete). A monitoring agent A
1
who is a
member of T and is exeuting P
1
would detet a failure in maintaining teamwork relationships
with an agent A
2
(also a member of T ) exeuting a dierent plan P
2
, if A
2
has an observably
dierent role in P
1
and P
2
.
Proof. A
1
knows that it is exeuting P
1
. Sine all members of T monitor eah other and
themselves, A
1
is monitoring A
2
, who has an observably dierent role in P
1
and P
2
. Sine A
2
is exeuting P
2
, and following the observably dierent role, P
1
=2M(A
1
; A
2
=P
2
). Therefore
from the perspetive of A
1
, it annot be the ase that it assigns P
1
in any agent-modeling
hypothesis, and therefore any team-modeling hypothesis that A
1
has will have A
1
exeuting
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P
1
, and A
2
exeuting some plan other than P
1
. In other words, from A
1
's perspetive there is
no team-oherent hypothesis, and so a dierene would be deteted between A
1
and A
2
.
Theorem. (# 5, page 134). Let a monitoring agent A monitor mutual-exlusion relation-
ships in a group of agents G. If A's modeling of G is omplete, and A uses a maximally
team-inoherent hypothesis for detetion, then the failure detetion results are sound.
Proof. We will show that if no failure has ourred, none will be deteted, and thus that
any failure that is deteted is in fat a failure. Let a
1
; : : : ; a
n
be the agent members of
G. Eah agent a
i
is exeuting some plan P
i
(1  i  n). Thus olletively, the group is
exeuting (P
1
; : : : ; P
n
). If no failure has ourred, then eah agent is exeuting a dierent
plan (i 6= j ) P
i
6= P
j
). Sine A's group-modeling is omplete, the orret hypothesis is
going to be in the set of group-modeling hypotheses H. Sine it is a maximally inoherent
hypothesis, either it will be seleted, or that a dierent hypothesis of the same oherene
level will be seleted. Any hypothesis with the same oherene level as the orret one
implies no failure is deteted. Thus the detetion proedure is sound.
Theorem. (# 6, page 134). Let a monitoring agent A monitor mutual-exlusion relation-
ships in a group of agents G. If A's modeling of G is omplete, and A uses a maximally
team-oherent hypothesis for detetion, then the failure detetion results are omplete.
Proof. We will show that any failure that ours is deteted, and thus that the proedure
is omplete. Let a
1
; : : : ; a
n
be the agent members of G. Eah agent a
i
is exeuting some
plan P
i
(1  i  n). Thus olletively, the group is exeuting (P
1
; : : : ; P
n
). If a failure
has ourred, then there are two agents a
k
; a
j
; 1  j; k  n suh that a
j
is exeuting plan
P
j
and a
k
is exeuting plan P
k
and P
j
= P
k
. Sine A's group-modeling is omplete, the
orret hypothesis (P
1
; : : : ; P
j
; : : : ; P
k
; : : : P
n
) will in the set of group-modeling hypotheses.
Sine A will hoose a maximally team-oherent hypothesis, either it will hoose the orret
hypothesis, whih is more oherent than a hypothesis implying no failure has ourred, or
that it will selet a hypothesis with greater oherene hypothesis (or equivalent level). In
any ase, a failure would be deteted. Therefore, the detetion proedure is omplete.
Appendix B. Soially-Attentive Monitoring Algorithms
We bring here the algorithms (in pseudo-ode) for the RESL plan-reognition algorithm,
the omparison test supporting detetion in both simple and non-simple teams, and the
monitoring algorithms for the entralized and distributed ases.
B.1 RESL
RESL works by rst expanding the omplete operator hierarhy for the agents being mod-
eled, tagging all plans as non-mathing. All plans' preonditions and termination onditions
are agged as non-mathing as well. All plans' ations are set to be used as expetations
on behavior. After initializing the plan-reognition hierarhy for eah monitored agent, ob-
servations of an agent are ontinuously mathed against the ations expeted by the plans.
Plans whose expetations math observations are tagged as mathing, and these ags are
propagated along the hierarhy, up and down, so that omplete paths through the hierarhy
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are agged as mathing or not. These paths speify the possible mathing interpretations of
the observations. In addition, preondition and termination onditions are agged as true
or not, signifying the inferred appropriate belief by the modeled agents. This proess is
desribed in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 RESL's main loop, mathing observation and making inferenes for a given
plan-reognition hierarhy (a single agent).
1. Get observations about agent
2. For eah plan that has a set of expeted observations:
(a) Compare observations to expetations
(b) If sueed, ag plan as mathing suessfully, otherwise ag plan as failing to math
3. For eah plan that is agged as mathing suessfully
(a) Flag its parents as mathing suessfully // propagate mathing
4. For eah plan whose hildren (all of them) are agged as failing to math
(a) Flag it as failing to math // propagate non-mathing
B.2 Detetion of Failure, Centralized and Distributed Teamwork Monitoring
Algorithm 2 shows how omparison of hierarhial plans is arried out. We limit ourselves
here to simple-teams. The algorithm aepts as input two sets of hierarhial plan hypothe-
ses, and their two assoiated agents (for larity, the algorithms assume only two agents.
The generalization to n agents is straightforward). The algorithm also aepts a poliy ag,
Poliy. An OPTIMISTIC poliy auses the algorithm to use maximal team-oherene to
provide sound, but inomplete detetion. A PESSIMISTIC poliy auses the algorithm to use
maximal team-inoherene to provide omplete, but unsound detetion.
The set of hierarhial plans are marked hierarhy_1 and hierarhy_2. The two agents
are marked agent_1 and agent_2. The algorithm makes use of the prediate Sub-team,
whih is true if the two agents (Agent1, Agent2) belong to dierent sub-teams at the given
level of the hierarhy (Depth).
With the aid of Algorithm 2, we an now dene the entralized and distributed fail-
ure detetion algorithms. The entralized teamwork monitoring algorithm (Algorithm 3)
utilizes Algorithm 2 twie, heking for failures with both PESSIMISTIC and OPTIMISTIC
poliies. If the results of both poliies agree, they are ertain. If the results do not agree,
(i.e., the PESSIMISTIC poliy auses a failure to be deteted, while the OPTIMISTIC poliy
auses no failure to be deteted), then the monitoring agent annot be ertain that a failure
has taken plae, and therefore needs to verify the failure. Algorithm 3 therefore returns
FAILURE, NO_FAILURE, POSSIBLE_FAILURE.
The distributed monitoring algorithm is not given in pseudo-ode form, beause it is
nothing more than a all to Algorithm 2 with an OPTIMISTIC poliy parameter. Its power
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Algorithm 2 Hierarhial omparison of two agents, allowing for sub-teams.
1. Set Depth to 0 // look for top-most dierene rst
2. While both plans at depth Depth are team-plans Do
(a) if Poliy == OPTIMISTIC
i. then Let Plan_1, Plan_2 be maximally team-oherent plans at level Depth
of hierarhy_1 and hierarhy_2, respetively.
ii. else Let Plan_1, Plan_2 be maximally team-inoherent plans at level Depth
of hierarhy_1 and hierarhy_2, respetively.
(b) If Plan_1 is not equal to Plan_2
i. then return FAILURE
ii. else if bottom of hierarhies reahed, return NO_FAILURE, otherwise in-
rease Depth and go to 2.
3. If only one plan is a team-plan, return FAILURE, else return NO_FAILURE.
Algorithm 3 Centralized Teamwork Monitoring, applying both optimisti and pessimisti
views.
1. Let Optimisti_Result = Detet(agent_1, agent_2, hierarhies_1,
hierarhies_2, OPTIMISTIC)
/* algorithm 2 */
2. Let Pessimisti_Result = Detet(agent_1, agent_2, hierarhies_1,
hierarhies_2, PESSIMISTIC)
/* algorithm 2 */
3. if Optimisti_Result == Pessimisti_Result
4. then return Optimisti_Result /* either FAILURE, or NO_FAILURE */
5. else return POSSIBLE_FAILURE
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is derived from the fat that all members of the team are using it to monitor the key agents
of the team.
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